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1. INTRODUCTION
As this essay is written many individuals believed to have
adhered to the cause of terrorist activities against the United
States, including participation in or support of the September
11, 2001 attacks in New York and at the Pentagon building, are
in U.S. military custody. Maintained by the U.S. Marine Corps,
the conditions of a detention camp in Cuba attract regular news
coverage. Some such persons are detained elsewhere. In a pro-
claimed war against terrorism, one that by definition cannot
end with either an armistice or the conventional peace treaty of
yesteryear, it is inevitable that more persons will surrender to
the U.S. or be seized during military operations in other coun-
tries. This is a war not only without a light at the end of the
tunnel but no clear roadmap as to future battlefields.
While most detainees are unquestionably of foreign nation-
ality, the emergence of at least two alleged American-citizen
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Among other subjects
Prof. Stein has been teaching National Security Law for a dozen years and has a
background in the area as an Army Intelligence officer (1965-1968) including ser-
vice on the Army General Staff at the National Command level. Professor Stein
frequently comments on National Security issues for various media as well as lec-
turing on those subjects.
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members of the terrorist group presumably responsible for the
September 11 attacks complicates already muddy legal waters.
How such persons, when taken on foreign soil, are classi-
fied is not simply a matter of nomenclature. Their treatment
may wholly or largely be determined by whether they are
viewed and defined as international criminals, as are, for exam-
ple, pirates or whether they are accorded the status of Prisoners
of War (POW) under either an existing international compact or
through some modified interpretation of prevailing
agreements."
This essay allows the writer to enter a fluid fray being
played out almost day-by-day in the media and, of course, where
it counts: in the administration of President George W. Bush.
Conscious of the ebbs and drifts of both the current debates and
desperately anxious not to be preempted by the march of a
swiftly moving time frame, this essay suggests an approach to
U.S. integration of generally accepted rules for the treatment of
POWs that will advance both the war on terrorism and
America's need to embrace the reality of the globalization of hu-
manistic mores and notions about justice without surrendering
our sovereignty. 2
II. WHAT IS "WAR" IN A POST-MODERNIST AMERICA? (OR IN
THE WEST, GENERALLY)
The issue as to whether to classify detained "fighters"3 as
POWs or as some form of international criminal deserving no
1 The most significant international accord for the protection of prisoners of
war is, of course, the Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, TIAS No. 3364, 75
UNTS 135, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y3gctpw.htm.
An indispensable source of documents relating to the laws of war is maintained on
the Web at The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, The Laws of War at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/lawwar.htm.
2 There is no real way to avoid using the term "war" when referring to the
campaign against terrorism. That the word has been expanded in post-modernist
speech to embrace everything from political efforts to alleviate poverty to preserv-
ing the environment to ensuring that "no child is left behind" is actually very rele-
vant to the arguments made in this essay.
3 "Fighters" seems to be a generally accepted normative term for those cap-
tured in Afghanistan, Israel, the Gaza Strip or wherever. Whatever else such per-
sons may be, they have been engaged in fighting or, at the least, are alleged to
have been so engaged. During March and April 2002, the term "gunmen" has been
increasingly applied to armed Palestinians encountered by Israeli military forces
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protection from standards especially formulated to shield con-
ventional combatants from dangers and harms generally abhor-
rent to Western political and military dogma is a pressing one.
Fighters for the purpose of this essay are defined as individuals
under arms in an organization that is not a national military
force but have some significant attributes of traditional military
components. These may include being organized into units, hav-
ing a rank structure, responding to a command system, training
in a coherent organizational manner and other aspects of con-
ventional military identity. Such persons are in support of a
military and political goal and are engaged in combat against
the government of a nation or against other nations who are
viewed as hostile to their political agenda. To be considered as
POWs entitled to the protections afforded by international law,
their capture must take place in a country other than that of
the capturing power.4
Without understanding the nature of warfare in the early,
modern and continuing post-modern eras, including the shifting
meaning of the profession of arms, analyzing the status of
Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees will be incomplete, indeed fun-
damentally misleading.5
"Artillery lends dignity to what otherwise would be a com-
mon brawl." The author was a young Army officer going
through training as a Counterintelligence Officer and Special
Agent at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, then located at Fort
Holabird, in Baltimore, Maryland in early 1965. Desiring that
its intelligence officers understand the history and nature of
other branches, part of the course consisted of short orientation
during their continuing incursions into the territory of Yasser Arafat. Treatment
of captured "gunmen" does not appear to be in accordance with the Geneva Con-
vention as they are not recognized as members of a nation state's military. Even
the term "gunmen" reflects an attempt to separate this cohort from the world of
soldiers entitled to customary legal protections.
4 The language and tenor of the Geneva Convention, and predecessors in-
cluding the American Lieber Code, presume that legal duties of care for captured
enemy combatants (and protection of non-combatants) arises in the context of a
war with a nation state. The key exception in American history was the Civil War
where pragmatic and overwhelming reality dictated that de facto status be ac-
corded to the Confederate States of America forces encountered in the field.
5 Two indispensable starting points for all researchers, to which I am much
indebted, are CHRISTOPHER COKER, TERRORISM AND CIVIL STRIFE (John Pimlott ed.,
1987) and CHRISTOPHER COKER, WAR AND THE ILLIBERAL CONSCIENCE (1998).
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lectures about every other arm of the service. The quotation
heading this paragraph was at the top of a projected slide that
occupied an entire screen. The picture showed characters out of
the age of castles walloping each other with an odd assortment
of comical hand weapons including oversized spears and rather
large rocks. It was a brawl writ large.
Undercutting the humor of the slide was the very serious
lecture by an artillery officer whose purpose was not simply to
tell us about his branch but to make us understand that artil-
lery brought a sort of humanistic warriorhood to land combat.
In that sense, he was both part of and an extension of an
evolved Western concept of warfare and the warrior that must
be re-examined in the post-modern context of military engage-
ments against forces described as terroristic.
The Western tradition of warfare glorifies virtues seldom
found in combat but sought through adoption first of codes of
conduct and later through domestic and international law. The
very notions of both chivalry and the theologically imbued phi-
losophy of Just War support the dual concepts of personal enno-
blement and achieving that status through the avoidance of
unnecessary imposition of harm on non-combatants and cap-
tured enemies. That the exception has always been more of the
rule, that the warrior class has constantly had to redefine itself
and explain incremental departures from earlier practices, is
the reality. Curbing excessive violence through codes of con-
duct 6 has clashed consistently with technological development,
the increased scale of warfare, barbarism born of rampant na-
tionalism and ethnic centrality in conflicts, and vastly wider
theaters of military and naval operations.7
6 See, e.g., The Law of Land Warfare, in THE UNITED STATE ARMY FIELD MAN-
UAL, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/fieldman.
html
7 Warfare has gone through technologically mediated phases in the past two
hundred years. Combat of rather brief duration yielded to extensive and prolonged
operations with significant and often fatal impact on civilian populations. The
rapid abandonment of what were believed to be accepted concepts of limited aerial
warfare early in World War II led to the carpet bombing (a very accurate term) of
cities in England, Europe and Japan. The current emphasis on Precision Guided
Munitions is part wise operational tactics and part sound public relations. The
Western world in general, the United States in particular, takes scant comfort in
military operations that bring about substantial "collateral damage," the loss of
civilians as opposed to combatants. John Keegan has best discussed the evolving
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In Western culture where military and naval valor were
respected in societies that sometimes were relatively inclusive
of military professionals and those that regarded them as neces-
sary evils, self-definition of the warrior class was unavoidable,
indeed indispensable.8
The professional soldiers of today's Western armed services
are in a complex, evolving departure from his/her forbears.9
The Western attitude toward great violence has changed radi-
cally since World War II for a host of reasons. The enormity of
worldwide suffering in the Second World War triggered an
ongoing revulsive factor toward such combat not wholly based
simply on fear of its possible repetition. The recognition that
"hot wars" can end in stalemates, as in Korea 10 or that the un-
thinkable - that the U.S. might lose a war - actually happened;
Vietnam, tempered sentiment that previously supported an
aroused warrior mentality that supported the professionals
leading, largely, the amateurs.
Several key factors have led to a general post-modern con-
sensus disfavoring broad (geographical) and lengthy military
campaigns. 1 Post-modern society exhibits little of the patience
associated with past generations. Familiarity with military and
Western abhorrence of broad and lasting infliction of casualties in a number of his
books, especially JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE (1977). The writings of
Archer Jones also illuminate the changing nature of Western warfare.
8 Influencing today's events is the long American dilemma of the role of the
professional military vis-h-vis the volunteer soldier. A part of American constitu-
tional law and political history, the generalized belief in and dependence on volun-
teers (and later conscriptees) serving under a needed but often spurned
professional cadre is in some degree of conflict with the contemporary all-volunteer
Armed Forces.
9 The mere reality of the feminization of most contemporary military forces is
beyond the scope of this discussion but is not irrelevant. Rapidly fading is the
exclusive masculinity of the military, in itself largely a source of didactic values
concerning the definition of who a warrior is and how he regards his foes, faced on
the fields or captured.
10 See BEVIN ALEXANDER, KOREA, THE FIRST WAR WE LOST (1986). The politi-
cal fallout from the American policy to settle for an armistice rather than strive for
a comprehensive military victory, ended President Truman's hopes for a second
full term and shifted U.S. foreign and domestic policy dramatically.
11 As indicated previously, the citizens of most Western nations recoil from
the possibility of lengthy and costly military engagements. Whether technology
has oversold itself or there are unrealistic expectations of modern ordnance, the
fact remains that Americans, in particular, expect that the nation's military opera-
tions will be short and as bloodless as possible (that is, with regard to U.S.
casualties).
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naval options and operations comes through an ever present
media that, beginning in the Vietnam conflict, brought war into
America's (and other country's) living rooms; and in color. With
it came the increased momentum of a generalized rejection of
widespread imposition of violence affecting civilian
populations.1 2
While treatment of POWs and indiscriminate or deliberate
infliction of widespread civilian casualties may be separate is-
sues for both international law and military science, the West-
ern populace as a whole does not make such distinctions. With
regard to POWs, American prisoners, horror became the central
reaction as news of Japanese maltreatment and torture of our
personnel in World War II became common knowledge.13 The
horrific maltreatment of both captured military personnel (Al-
lied as well as American) and civilian internees was a major
part of the prosecution of Japanese war crimes at both the In-
ternational Military Tribunal for the Far East and local trials in
areas that had been Japanese-occupied. 14 Death penalties for
killing prisoners and internees and being responsible for the
acts of subordinates were handed down in quite a few cases.
15
A second, sensitizing experience for Americans (and also to
a lesser degree for other Westerners) was the shock of discover-
ing during and after the Korean conflict that POWs were sub-
12 Whether is was the bombing of Dresden, its horror expressed most widely
through KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE or an introspective, part fear-
based, part-humanitarian reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American popular
opinion favors achieving stated objectives with minimal force largely expended on
clearly military targets. The mistaken targeting of a handful of people is front-
page news with now expected negative reactions having serious political
implications.
13 The German record was, overall, better but nonetheless there were signifi-
cant departures from international law. The German treatment of captured Rus-
sians was wholly and by direct order of Adolf Hitler in abject disregard not only of
controlling international law but of several centuries of evolved rules of military
behavior. See BEVIN ALEXANDER, How HITLER COULD HAVE WON WORLD WAR I
(2001).
14 See generally International Military Tribunal for the Far East at http:/!
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfem.htm; see also Stephen's Study Room: British
Military & Criminal History in the Period of 1900-1999 at http://www.stephen-
stratford.co.uklimtfe.htm.
15 See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001) available at http:ll
www.bartleby.com/65/wa/warcrime.html. The postwar trials of Japanese generals
Homma and Yamashita, after which they were executed, remain both troubling
and controversial.
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jected not merely to illegal physical maltreatment but also
excruciatingly sophisticated and persistent psychological condi-
tioning, so-called "brainwashing."1 6 That a handful of Ameri-
can POWs could be conditioned to renounce their country and
accuse the U.S. of committing bizarre criminal acts forbidden by
international law (in particular, waging biological warfare) not
only astounded many, but also thoroughly frightened them.
Not even the Germans had tried that approach. The national
reaction was to further support and insist upon the application
of international law insofar as it forbade maltreatment of
POWs. 17 The Vietnam experience, in which captured Ameri-
cans, mostly Navy and Air Force officers of higher education
than their Korean War POW predecessors, occasionally suc-
cumbed to psychological manipulation reinforced a belief in the
right of POWs to be protected.18
The main problem is that most Americans then, and per-
haps now, define war in ways that may be largely irrelevant to
post-modern society. In American historical thought and expe-
rience, true war invoking evolved international and domestic
rules of humane treatment of prisoners was defined as hostili-
ties between powers having a Western form of government.
This approach was largely the successor in interest to the Brit-
ish doctrine, hardly hidden, that the rules of warfare were only
to be extended to the combatants of civilized nations. Thus, re-
straints on British military conduct during colonial wars were
limited by the values and orders of field commanders, not be-
cause of subordination to international or military law. Ameri-
can political and military practice followed that of Great
Britain.19
16 See American Defense Institute, The Captain's Chair (1997) at http:fl
www.ojc.org/adi/ccwinter.htm.
17 See id.
18 See Memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C.,
Office of the Director, for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (May 10, 1971) at http:llnation-
alalliance.org/tan0l.htm.
19 Whether it was the future Duke of Wellington's campaign against the
Mahrattas in India or U.S. forces fighting the Indians, no concept of warfare ac-
cording to the Western warriors code ever existed. Captured adversaries may or
may not be humanely treated according to the whims of the field commander or the
policies of the day. Neither was ever predictable or consistent.
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III. WARFARE MOVES IN Two CONTRADICTORY DIRECTIONS
In order to posit a theory as to how captured fighters who
adhere to a cause, rather than directly and traditionally serving
a nation state, ought to be treated today, a brief review of the
shifting nature of Western concepts about warfare and its prac-
tice is necessary.
Whatever the clear language of the U.S. Constitution as to
war-making authority, the reality is that the U.S. has only de-
clared war four times in its long history of military and naval
combat.20 In the period following World War II, strategic politi-
cal and military concerns militated against declarations of war
in Korea, Vietnam and, latterly, the conflict against Iraq and
the continuing operations in Afghanistan. Declaring war has
too many domestic and international ramifications, it is, simply,
not the way to go anymore. Without any alteration of interna-
tional law, Western nations have embraced the concept of lim-
ited war with stated objectives to be carried out by armed forces
charged, at their peril, with minimizing harm to non-combat-
ants and their property and also required to conclude hostilities
successfully within the shortest time possible.
The Western watchword is to conduct "humane warfare"
with little serious public analysis by a technology-sotted popula-
tion as to the possible oxymoron nature of such a concept. 21
Thus two somewhat contradictory paths are followed. War is
waged with minimal adherence to historic formalities that force
a sharp focus on government policies and aims and when forces
are engaged they are expected, indeed required, to fight the
most narrow and bloodless campaigns technology and command
oversight will permit. General "Unconditional Surrender"
Grant, neither as military commander nor as commander-in-
20 The four declared wars are the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War
and the two World Wars.
21 Perhaps the clearest manifestation of that concept is the public's demand
for and belief in the utility and effectiveness of a wide range of Precision Guided
Munitions ranging from "Smart Bombs" to non-lethal ordinance. That the success
rate of Precision Guided Munitions claimed in the Gulf War and now revealing
warts as after action analysis of their employment in Afghanistan indicates it is
less than both claimed and desired seems beyond the point for most people. With-
out doubt, losses to civilian populations have been significantly avoided by the use
of very expensive "smart" weapons.
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chief, would recognize the doctrinal terrain of post-modern
America (and that of other major Western powers). 22
IV. THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
In classical times, captured soldiers and sailors often faced
lifelong enslavement with their actuarial longevity being some-
what short.23 If they were lucky they might be slain shortly af-
ter capture. The practice of ransoming captives, familiar from
the legend and lore of the Middle Ages, only occurred when a
personage of worth might be redeemed for familial reasons, po-
litical reasons, 24 or both.25
Codes of chivalry dictated that those of knightly rank treat
opponents of the same grade with if not kindness at least not
with naked brutality. 26 A Western tradition of treating at least
some captives according to contemporary rules of leniency
slowly developed.
The emergence of a professional military caste in substitution
for the feudal leadership that combined political and military
duties with scant separation between the two reflected the be-
ginnings of the modern state. In England the rule of the regi-
cide, Oliver Cromwell marks the inauguration of a true
professional military class.2 7
By the time of the American Revolution, European codes of
conduct with regard to POWs were sufficiently developed as to
22 In print after more than a century, General Grant's "Memoirs," available in
a number of editions, reflect his strategic view of warfare, one that dominated
American thinking until the Korean War. See, e.g., Personal Memoirs: Ulysses S.
Grant, WAR TIMES J. at http://wtj.com/archives/grant/.
23 See, e.g., Avignon & Provence, at http://www.avignon-et-provence.com/avi-
gnon/histoire/gb/hist3.htm
24 See id. See also Yvonne Friedman, Encounter Between Enemies, at http:ll
www.brill.nl/catalogue/productinfo.asp?product=9103.
25 While ransom was sometimes a feature of Japanese and Chinese feudal
warfare, the practice never became as common as in the West.
26 See Brian R. Price, A Code of Chivalry at http://www.chronique.com/Li-
brary/Chivalry/code.htm.
27 Not coincidentally, the beginnings of a professional officer class in Crom-
well's New Model Avenue was accompanied by the forming of the first permanent
English regiments in a form which remains largely unchanged to the present. This
development, followed by other European powers, fostered the development of the
professional warrior class with its own traditions, uniforms (much later), distinc-
tive and important symbols of service and authority (decorations and insignia) and
system of laws and codes of conduct.
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allow serious challenge to British treatment of captured rebel-
lious colonists. 28 Following a then almost universal tradition,
people in armed rebellion were considered to be outside the law
of nations and the codes of military conduct and could be, and
often were, killed as traitors. 29
British treatment of captured Continental Army personnel
was exceedingly harsh and insured a commensurate surfeit of
outrage. Retaliation by the Continental Army was generally
isolated. As a matter of policy, prisoners were often reasonably
well protected from abuse. 30
Pre-modern European armies rarely had the resources to
maintain large numbers of POWs and were restrained by codes
of conduct from killing them. A legal process from an earlier
time, parole, became a dominant means to both neutralize
POWs without straining a belligerent's resources. 31 A paroled
prisoner swore not to engage in any hostilities against the cap-
turing power until exchanged for a similar prisoner held by his
side.3 2 While the literature of the era often talks about high-
ranking paroled officers enjoying, as it were, a liberal and
28 The famed and dreaded Prison Ships in New York harbor violated contem-
porary norms for housing prisoners of war but not for traitors, a fine legal point
maintained by the British but attracting little understanding from their foes.
Brooklyn's Fort Green park has a large monument, a pillar, memorializing the
thousands who died in inhumane, even by the standards of the time, conditions
about the Prison Ships. See generally HAMITON FISH, LL.D., NEW YORK STATE -
THE BATTLEGROUND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR (Vintage Press 1976) available at
http://www.longislandgenealogy.com/prison.html.
29 There are many online documents dealing with the treatment of prisoners
during the American Revolution. See, e.g., Virtual Marching Tour of the American
Revolution, The Philadelphia Campaign 1777 at http://www.ushistory.org/march/
philalwhitemarsh_3.htm. In Brooklyn's Fort Greene Park, a tall, slender monu-
ment attests to the Continental soldiers (and some hapless and uninvolved folks)
who suffered and died on British prisoner hulks in the Hudson River.
30 In any event, the often retreating and under-supplied Continental Army
had little ability to maintain significant bodies of captured enemy. Given the fluid-
ity of the war zones establishing camps for prisoners was impossible. Thus, parole
played a very important part in the Revolutionary War. The British, of course,
rarely reciprocated as they viewed all captured combatants as, at least in the least
sense, rebellious subjects not entitled to the courtesies of warfare. See generally
The George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, Time Line: The Ameri-
can Revolution at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/1776.html.
31 See generally, Richard Seltzer, The Rise, Progress, and Termination of the
American Revolution Interspersed with biographical, Political, and Moral Observa-
tion (1805), available at http://www.samizdat.com/warren/rev21.html.
32 See id.
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friendly quasi-leave among the enemy, in reality parole became
the system for transforming, at least temporarily low-ranking
enemy soldiers into a harmless and largely unsupervised
cohort.
The American Civil War created an unprecedented chal-
lenge to the issue of limiting war through law and, of immediate
relevance, the treatment of personnel captured or who surren-
dered. While the Southern rebellion can be analyzed, legally
and technically, as a criminal conspiracy from start to finish,
the form and organization of the Confederate government and
the forces raised under its flag mirrored almost exactly the Fed-
eral government and less exactly but significantly that of Euro-
pean governments. In no way could the Lincoln administration
recognize the Southern government as a dejure entity. To do so
would be to undermine any Constitutional theory of the insepa-
rability of the Federal Union. 33
On the other hand, meeting Confederate forces in the field
and recognizing that each side would inevitably take prisoners
and accept surrenders forced a rational accommodation be-
tween the demands of Constitutional law and theory and the
realities of what was a major war. 34
Into the breach came Francis Lieber and his code of war-
fare, the first thorough American codification of discreet laws
and regulations previously scattered throughout federal law. 35
The Lieber Code encapsulated both formalized and generally
accepted rules of Western law and practice for the treatment of
POWs while also addressing special aspects of the then raging
Civil War including the treatment of slaves encountered or
taken into custody. At a time when military orders resisted
easy reading and obtuse language permeated legal writing, the
Lieber Code was remarkably clear. It was intended to be under-
stood by Union officers of all ranks and not solely by staff judge
advocates.
33 The literature on the claimed right to secede is vast and ever growing and is
not relevant to this article. My view of Southern constitutional theory may be
found in my article, Ralph M. Stein, The South Won't Rise Over Again but it's Time
to Study the Defunct Confederacy's Constitution, 21 PACE L. REV. 395 (Spring
2001).
34 See id.
35 The Lieber Code available at http://www.ptialaska.net/-swampy/powers/
mart law.html#sec3.
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The Lieber code forbade the execution of POWs not other-
wise convicted of capital crimes. 36 It forbade physical maltreat-
ment and recognized the right of POWs to adequate
nourishment and shelter.37 Following customary law, it pro-
vides for the death penalty for spies, traitors and criminals
seeking to benefit from the disturbed state brought by war.38
While Union practice never followed the letter of the code and
abuses occurred, to a large degree the Lieber Code, which was
thoroughly disseminated and largely enforced, insured that the
captives of the federal army stood a better chance of humane
treatment than had been accorded prisoners in many prior Eu-
ropean wars.39
The twentieth century saw the greatest expansion of inter-
national law through treaty, compact and domestic legislation
in history. The laws of war were revised, recodified and ex-
panded. 40 World War I showed the need to bring controls on to
the practice of law and the technology spawned to wage war.
Postwar conferences such as the Washington and London naval
conferences sought, ultimately with devastating results for the
Western democracies, to cap naval expansionism. The issue of
POWs was, however, a major concern.
Whether arrived at Geneva or The Hague, both promi-
nent localities for the negotiation of international compacts
addressing warfare, the issue of treatment of POWs was cen-
tral to a number of conferences. In 1929, the United States
entered into the "Convention Between the United States
of America and Other Powers, Relating to Prisoner of
36 See id. arts. 48-80.
37 See id. art. 76.
38 See id. art. 83.
39 The Confederacy never adopted, the Lieber Code but its practices, at least
in the field and during the first two years or so of the conflict largely mirrored
federal practice. MAcKNLAY KANTOR, ANDERSONVILLE (1993) effectively captures
the horror of the Confederate camp for federal POWs in Georgia but the situation
in the North was often about the same. A glaring and often unremarked upon
departure by Confederate military authorities from general principles of treating
POWs was the systematic brutalization and even cold-blooded murder of captured
black soldiers.
40 This essay is limited to issues involving POWs but the Yale Avalon Project
offers an enormous quantity of documents on the laws of war from the eighteenth
century on. It is an unsurpassed Web-based resource. The Avalon Project at the
Yale Law School, 2 0 th Century Documents at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
20th.htm.
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War."41 The gravaman of the Geneva Convention, ratified by
many nations (but not, to their awful eventual detriment, by the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 42 was that all POWs were
entitled to safety from hostile or friendly fire,43 removal from
the immediate area of combat as expeditiously as possible 44 and
protection from arbitrary execution, inhumane treatment and
inadequate food and shelter.45 Reflecting the warrior code that
the politicians accepted from their military advisors, the Ge-
neva Convention also provided that POWs could wear decora-
tions and prescribed when officers of the custodial power had to
be saluted. The signers vowed that it "will be the duty of every
Power to diminish, so far as possible the unavoidable rigors
thereof and to mitigate the fate of prisoners of war."
46
Most critically, the definition of a person entitled to POW
status was framed based on the realities and nature of warfare
as it was then known. Indeed, the Geneva Convention virtually
accepts, without commentary, the assumption that a prisoner of
war is a recognized formal member of his nation's armed
forces.47 Of relevance today and often overlooked, the Geneva
Convention of 1929 and subsequent amendments and other
compacts specifically recognize that POWs may be punished for
crimes committed prior to capture or after. According POW sta-
tus to any detainee cannot be a defense against prosecution for
crimes committed whether in furtherance of military orders or
as part of what is denominated as a terrorist organization.
41 Convention Between the United States of America and other Powers Relat-
ing to Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021 (1932), revised in Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST
3316, TIAS No. 3364, 75 UNTS 135.
42 Hitler used the absence of the U.S.S.R. as a signatory as part of his basis
for ordering that Soviet prisoners be treated in any manner expedient, specifically
directing that no act that would constitute a war crime when committed against a
Geneva Convention signatory would be so regarded when committed against a
Russian. Hitler's order also specifically authorized the summary execution of any
Russian deemed dangerous with only an officer required to pass sentence. In prac-
tice no such authorization was sought nor could it be for the mass murders com-
mitted by the Germans.
43 Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 23.
44 Id. art. 19.
45 Id. arts. 25-28.
46 Id. at preamble.
47 The drafters and signers of the Geneva Convention never envisioned female
combatants but they did require signatories to respect women. Article 3 provides
that '"Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex."
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While there are procedural safeguards with reference to imposi-
tion of the death penalty, its availability is granted for serious
crimes.48
Generally, U.S. forces observed the Geneva Convention
provisions during the Second World War (in any event, much of
the convention language tracked that of the Lieber Code, which
in American military law was in effect continuously from the
Civil War).49 American observance of the Geneva Convention
and related legal protection for POWs continued throughout the
Korean War (where, as previously noted, such adherence to law
was not reciprocated by either the North Koreans or their Chi-
nese ally).
The long and costly Vietnam conflict produced a series of
challenges regarding protection of POWs by U.S. forces. For the
first time in a major war, a significant part of a presumably ci-
vilian population engaged in warfare that could not be dis-
missed under the older legal rubric of partisan activities. 50
What had fundamentally changed was the mode of warfare.
Belligerents largely without motorized vehicles, tanks and
heavy artillery and with no air assets adapted to fighting a su-
perpower through guerilla warfare in league with a conven-
tional armed force, the North Vietnamese Army.51
The U.S. largely skirted the issue of defining POW status
by turning over to Army of Viet Nam units most of the captured
personnel. That such persons were often abused or even killed
rekindled debate about treatment of prisoners in the context of
an increasingly questioned and unpopular armed conflict.5 2
That such persons were not infrequently female and sometimes
48 Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 100.
49 Adherence to the Geneva Code was far greater in Europe than in the Pa-
cific, but far fewer prisoners were taken from Japanese forces. When they were
taken, it was often within the confines of a small and volatile combat zone where
violations of rights were, at the least, understandable if not excusable. In any
event the inescapable reality is that the Pacific war had major racial overtones, a
factor not without pressing comparison with regard to the current domestic and
foreign U.S. war on terrorism.
50 This is a position I have heard stated a number of times.
51 The parallel to the continuing and dangerous Israel/Palestine conflict is
obvious.
52 Paradoxically, one of the most inflammatory photos of the war, the single
shot to the head execution of a North Vietnamese officer in civilian clothes by GEN
Loan was in substance, if not in nuanced procedure, lawful under the Laws of War
(including the Geneva Convention).
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even children complicated the matter greatly.53 What was clear
was that in a major military operation consuming vast assets
and continuing for years, the line between the traditionally de-
fined soldier and other parties engaging in combat had been
blurred beyond previous wars in numbers, scope and impor-
tance. There was no justification for the My Lai massacre, but
it happened for no better reason than the depraved whim of a
junior officer.
My Lai and other incidents, occurring at a time when the
American military was assailed from many quarters of our soci-
ety (to say nothing of foreign criticism), forced the services to
reexamine not whether sufficiently detailed law existed to pro-
tect POWs but whether the troops on the line understood their
responsibilities and were committed to obeying the law.5 4 Ini-
tial inquiries did not return reassuring answers. At least at the
level of the uniformed services, especially the Army and the
Marine Corps, those most likely to take prisoners, indoctrina-
tion regarding protection of POWs was intensified and account-
ability stressed and where necessary enforced by a career-
ending process. Instruction in the rights of POWs and the corre-
sponding duties of American military personnel became an inte-
gral and frequently reviewed aspect of training, especially in
overseas deployments where encounters with a hostile force
was either likely or insured. 55
53 See generally SEYMOUR HERSH, My LAI 4: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND
ITS AFTERMATH (1970); SEYMOUR HERSH, COVER-UP: THE ARMY'S SECRET INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE MASSACRE AT My LAI 4 (1973).
54 Recently, I asked the students in the three classes I teach if they knew of
the My Lai massacre. With class attendances at 19, 22, and 65, only 0, 1 and 6,
respectively, indicated that they had ever heard of the massacre. Now out-of-print,
Seymour Hersh's two books, following his groundbreaking revelations about the
Army murder of women, children and male noncombatants remain essential read-
ing. Much has happened in the American military since the Vietnam War to not
only reduce the chance that a junior officer will order a massacre with soldiers
responding to his commands but that the cover-up which tarnished the Army is
unlikely to be repeated. I hope.
55 I am a member of the Navy League of the United States and at a recent
meeting a Marine officer sitting with me at dinner pulled a wallet card issued to
every Marine which said, among other things, that Marines don't kill prisoners.
Training in protecting prisoners has been reduced to that level of simplicity and
ubiquity.
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V. AND Now, WHAT Do WE Do WITH THE TALIBAN AND
AL QAEDA FIGHTERS?
First, the quick answer every law student wishes would
precede discussion of difficult material. Without ignoring the
very real differences between members of Taliban forces and
members of or detained supporters of Al Qaeda, an interna-
tional organization having no known formal relationship to any
government, I believe all such detainees should be accorded
Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Convention and rele-
vant United States law. Doing so represents not a rejection of
existing law but a relevant and imperative growth of principled
American recognition of post-modern values, whether well-
formed or emergent.
For the purposes of this essay, a member of the Taliban is,
or more accurately was, part of the armed forces of a nation
state, that nation being Afghanistan. That the Taliban did not,
or could not, clothe its ground force with the traditional appur-
tenances of military service ought to be of no concern. Its forces
were at the least rudimentarily organized in military fashion,
had a rank structure, received varying but recognizable degrees
of military training and were empowered by a government-in-
being to exercise duties compatible with those of a historically
denominated national military force. Obviously not the least of
such responsibilities was defense of Afghanistan against foreign
troops. The arguments against treating captured Taliban
soldiers as other than persons entitled to Geneva Convention
protection are weak, to put it mildly.
The Al Qaeda detainees are different in significant ways
but not to the extent that they should not be treated as POWs.
They are different in that they belong to an organization be-
longing, formally, to no country and they act on behalf of,
openly, no government. To the extent that such persons are
caught committing or planning criminal acts in any country,
they can be and should be subject to that country's laws as ac-
cused criminals. The story is different when they engage in or-
ganized combat against an opposing force under circumstances
that reflect the reality that combat is being waged by U.S. mili-
tary assets outside this country. That such detainees were cap-
tured or that they surrendered along with Taliban troops
strengthens the assumption that they were engaged in military
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operations. 56 Of course the feelings run much higher in the
U.S. (and elsewhere) against Al Qaeda members than against
the captured remnants of the wrecked Taliban regime.
As of the date of this writing, the Bush administration con-
tinues to waver over the issue of according Geneva Convention
protection for the detainees, the majority whom are now at the
Guantanamo Navy Base in Cuba. In an administration unusu-
ally free of reports of internal dissent, only Secretary of State
Powell has clearly and publicly indicated his preference to
clothe the detainees with Geneva Convention protections
(which does not, automatically, require application of the Pris-
oner of War label but the association would be unavoidable if
the protections were extended). While it is clear that the Ad-
ministration agrees that due process in some form is both man-
dated and accepted, the lines of procedure to be followed remain
hazy.57
While support for extending Geneva Convention protec-
tions to some of the detainees appears to be taking hold in the
Bush administration it may well be for the wrong reasons. The
realistic question as to how American military personnel might
be treated if we fail to apply international law protections had
dominated the discussion and may have dictated a resolution.
Given the organizations and individuals arrayed against this
country and their ideological, theologically-driven agendas it is
not likely that reciprocity with regard to treatment of captured
56 A historical precedent is not without relevance. In World War II, the Ger-
man Schutzstaffel, more commonly known as the SS, was divided into two general
groupings. One was the separate combat units, the Waffen-SS, which was organ-
ized into traditional combat formations, was fully integrated into the German Or-
der of Battle and which waged war. That members of such units often committed
atrocities is besides the point as such persons were fully amenable to prosecution.
Members of such units were, when captured, always legally entitled to POW sta-
tus. By contrast those members of the SS assigned to various duties the most hei-
nous of which was running concentration camps were never accorded POW status
but were treated as members of a criminal organization (as were members, for
example, of the Gestapo). Distinguishing between the two elements was done in
World War II despite the heady emotionalism associated with anything bearing
the title of "SS."
57 One reason for the murky picture is that while prisoners of war who have
allegedly committed crimes have, in the past, possessed little or no potential value
as informants the case is quite different here. The contradictory stresses induced
by dealing with enemies who may be chargeable with capital offenses but who may
possess information of value to the United States are real.
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personnel is an important consideration in their thinking, or
any consideration at all. 58
The real argument for according Geneva Convention pro-
tections for Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners is the recognition
that America's role in the post-modern world requires our un-
derstanding of strongly held views about the role of humane
treatment of captives in warfare, irrespective of the foe's devo-
tion to such principles. A large segment of the First World has
turned away from capital punishment; the U.S. has not as a na-
tion. A large segment of the First World is strongly committed
to employing legal stratagems against terrorism before embrac-
ing military solutions to an extent the United States has not.
Bellicosity, especially of the unilateral American type, disturbs
much of post-modern Europe. President Bush's exclamation
that he wants Osama bin Laden "dead or alive" played very well
domestically. It was a chilling and unacceptable statement
from our nation's leader for much of the world.
Conditioned by media exposure to the nature of modern
military operations and seduced by the often false promise of
precision attacks with "smart" weapons, many Americans and
citizens of other countries have gravitated profoundly to a new
and possibly unrealistic but compelling model of warfare as a
highly limited, generally brief, surgically precise, limited de-
struction, few casualties event. Arguments exist to refute such
beliefs, but the reality is that in the war against terroristic ac-
tivities for which no final victory is remotely foreseeable, bal-
ancing American interests against the concerns of those needed
as allies is absolutely vital. National security interests cannot
be surrendered and neither can American sovereignty where it
validly exists. What is essential is accommodating values that
are reflective of a fundamental shift in the politics and views of
post-modern nations. Those nations still moving through the
various stages of modernity have their own problems.
The issue of the detainees is a prime example where with-
out any loss of strategic goals a principled adherence to cloaking
58 Another historical example is the attitude of the Japanese in World War II
toward captured Caucasian prisoners. Since they had zero regard for their own
personnel who had been captured, how they were treated played no role in the way
Allied prisoners were regarded. There is a strong parallel with current religion-
affiliated groups employing both terrorism and military operations.
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our Guantanamo detainees (and others sure to follow) with the
Geneva Convention protections solidifies international support
for an effort in which this country is the acknowledged leader
and would be an adoption of international law principles in-
creasingly regarded as fundamental by the majority of devel-
oped countries. It would be a win-win position for the United
States.
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